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ABSTRACT

This essay examines the nature of scholarship in today's higher education institutions and seeks to develop an inclusive and constructive definition. The paper argues that because modern academe has adopted a destructively narrow and often obscure definition of scholarship, we lack the clear approach necessary for curricular balance and constructive dialogue. In addition, it is argued, current scholarly tradition avoids critical self-evaluation. Looking for a way to redefine scholarship to reestablish a check and balance system, the paper suggests that there have been three scholarly traditions, the "faithful" scholarship concerned the human relation to God, the "rhetorical tradition" concerned with relations between and among human beings, and the "scientific" tradition that focuses on the "reality" of the natural world. The paper discusses the limits of scholarship in general, and examines each of the three traditions in some detail. Scholarship must be redefined if it is to contribute to clarifying contemporary moral confusion and the concept of scholarship itself must be recognized as a means and not an end. With such a view, admission of ignorance would be the most constructive dissent available to the academic community. Twenty-five notes are included. (JB)

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Neil J. Flinders

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SCHOLARSHIP: TIME FOR A REDEFINITION

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Will Durrant observed early in this century that human knowledge had become too vast to manage, too great for the human mind. The academy was divided between scientific specialists who knew more and more about less and less and philosophical speculators who knew less and less about more and more. This schism was blurring an important distinction between philosophy and science: Science is analytical description, philosophy synthetic interpretation. Durant argued that "analysis belongs to science, and gives us knowledge; philosophy must provide a synthesis for wisdom" (1) Science, Durrant explained, is content to describe things as they are: to be equally interested in the leg of a flea and the creativity of a genius. Philosophy, on the other hand, seeks to go beyond the facts as they can be perceived, to determine meaning and worth, to combine things into an interpretive synthesis. "Science gives us knowledge, but only philosophy can give us wisdom."(2)

As this century concludes, I believe Durant's argument can be extended to explain much of the enigma in today's education. Durant's discontent, however, only focuses on part of the problem. He is considering only one of three traditions of scholarship common to Western culture: the *philosophic-scientific tradition*. He does not acknowledge either the *oratorical* or the *faithful* scholarly traditions. Hence two important legs of the schooling seat have been removed, leaving the intellectual community to sway amidst the winds of change. Decades of increasingly critical literature have provided ample evidence of a dizzying distortion of perspective. Never have we written more and agreed upon less. To correct our imbalance, we must broaden our perspective to include these additional aspects of what we know, understand and believe--the oratorical and the faithful; thus we face the need of redefining the concept of scholarship itself. The purpose of this paper is to suggest this more inclusive and constructive definition.

Introduction

The thesis of this paper is that modern academe has adopted a destructively narrow and often obscure definition of scholarship. We lack the clear and balanced approach necessary for curricular balance and constructive rather than destructive dialogue. Moreover current scholarly tradition avoids critical self-evaluation: A review of the literature reveals that modern scholarship has produced critical histories of everything in sight--everything, that is, except a critical study of itself.

Contemporary education, I believe, is precariously unbalanced due to this myopic view. Modern academia suffers from cataracts that mar our scholarly vision. C.S. Lewis used the word in another sense: he spoke of "the great cataract of nonsense that pours from the press and microphone of one's own age". (3) A major treatment for this condition is to dam and channel the flow of the cataract by consciously redefining scholarship to encourage rather than disparage *philosophical synthesis* in our scientific work and to legitimize both the *oratorical* and *faithful* traditions of scholarly work.

To do this, we must reestablish the tripartite *check and balance system* of scholarship. This check and balance system is as vital to the health and welfare of academia as the government check and balance system is to our republic. The alternative in the school, as in the government, is to succumb to special interest groups.

Three Scholarly Traditions

It has been said that the content of all the books ever written on philosophy can be categorized under three headings: *God, humankind,* and *nature.* Our heritage clearly embraces all three, and *scholarship* may be defined as the means of comprehending *messages*---between God and people, between one person and another, and between people and nature.

This paper suggests a pattern of scholarship that (a) encompasses all three relationships and (b) is a means to an end, not an end in itself. Scholarship is a tool used to search for the message (truth); it is the message, not the tool, that has primary value. With

the variations in messages, the tool must be flexible and subject to modification. When the tool (scholarship) eclipses the message (truth), that tool becomes a liability rather than an asset.

Three traditions of scholarship have been significant in the formation of Western culture. The first tradition, *faithful* scholarship, rooted in our Hebrew heritage, places a central emphasis on the human relationship to God. This approach presupposes that God reveals general truths to those who seek them, which truths become assumptions that direct and sustain scholarly effort in all areas. Transcendent testimonial evidence blends with reason and sensate experience. For example, the *Pentateuch* , attributed to Moses (4), implicitly accepts a vertical order of reality transcending mortality Human beings, earth, and time are symbolic of God, heaven, and eternity. Jewish scholarship speaks of the *vertical* in contrast to the *horizontal* ; modern vernacular uses *supernatural* and *natural* to indicate this distinction.

A second form of scholarship emerged as seekers endeavored to find knowledge by combining the oral and written accounts of human experience. This *oratorical* or *rhetorical* tradition, which comes to Western thought by way of ancient Greece, focuses primarily on relationships between and among human beings. As the Greeks sought to purify, preserve and transmit the message of the poets of antiquity, they sought to discover, participate in and vicariously share the human expression of experience. Hence the tradition focuses on the search for truth through the expressed wisdom of our human ancestry. The objects for this scholarship are found in language, art, and music. Essentially a naturalistic (horizontal) approach, this rhetorical tradition may be exercised independent of transcendent (vertical) influences.

A third approach to scholarship developed from efforts to understand and communicate the human relationship to nature. Western culture attributes this outlook to Greece, specifically to Anaximander, Anaxamenes, and Aristotle. This *scientific* or *philosophical* tradition focuses on the "reality" of the natural world, external to the human

mind. As with the oratorical tradition, this approach can be independent of the supernatural, presuming scholarship to be a conceptual design, a tool for discovery, separate from and above the message it seeks to reveal.

Scholarship Defined

The paper is built on a definition of scholarship that focuses on message--between God and people, between one person and another, and between people and nature, and functions as a tool in search of that message, subordinate not superior to the truth that it finds. It develops from the premise that scholarship should recognize interrelated natural and supernatural worlds, that rejecting a "dualistic metaphysics" is denying a significant dimension of possibility and thus diminishes and changes the nature of the search.

Recognizing the Limitations of Scholarly Traditions

Claims of "purity" in applied scholarship are unrealistic, as they depend on subjective compliance to what are, after all, symbolic cues to what represents the "best effort" but cannot be objectively established. Scholarly activity, whether on the mountain, at the library, or in the laboratory, cannot be adequately described in the parameters of the "scholarly report"; the recipient must judge or accept someone else's judgment--"on faith."

Some aspects of the scholarly search are inevitably (at times intentionally) left out of the report; others are assumed to be present because an overt symbol suggests that certain things occurred. A calendar of laboratory procedures, for instance, does not ensure every quality associated with those procedures, as explained by Michael Polanyi's (1958) discussion of *tacit* functions in the domain of science. (5) Within the *oratorical* tradition, reports by philologists are similarly affected: Mental constructions shaped by subjectively based world-views necessarily influence interpretive reports but are not mentioned explicitly; thus a linguistic theory common to a scholar's field may guide interpretation without being acknowledged or defined. Likewise, in the *faithful* tradition, what is recorded and then proclaimed is circumscribed by limitations: proficiency in writing,

prohibitions by Divinity, and peculiarities of the culture to which the word is given. Who knows all that Moses experienced on Mt. Sinai?

All three scholarly traditions are fragile because each of them must pass through human limitations to deliver its message. Some messages and some processes should not and others cannot be reduced to reportable language. Another limitation occurs when those who are comfortable within one tradition may find procedures and evidence compelling which fail to impress those outside the discipline. Consequently, true scholarship tends more toward humility than it does to certainty or pride . **Scholarly traditions, like any human traditions, can only be manifest through an individual personality; they have no life of their own and are therefore subject to the limitations of personality.** Scholarship should be used, but not abused--or used to abuse others. Scholarship is to be valued, but not worshipped.

Perhaps this is the most serious limitation of scholarship. Confusion is inevitable when methods of scholarship are captured and circumscribed by special interest groups. Guilds that commandeer some form of scholarship and then function like religious orders have created some of the greatest distortions in humanity's search for happiness. But this is a topic that deserves its own treatment.

The Oratorical Tradition

Joseph L. Featherstone offers the following explication and critique of the scholarly tradition which focuses on poetry, rhetoric, and oratory:

> The tradition of the orators . . . emphasizes the public expression of what is known, the crucial importance of language texts and tradition--linking to and building up a community of learning and knowledge. This is the line of Isocrates, Cicero, Isidore, the *artes liberales* of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance humanists, the vision of Matthew Arnold, of some teachers of the liberal arts today, especially humanities teachers, and, of course, of many religious colleges. The glory of the orator's line is its links with the texts of the past and its focus on re-creating learning communities as the central business of education; its problem, as in educational philosophy, is its dogmatic and anti-intellectual idolatry of the past and its frequent assumption that virtue resides in the texts, not in what we the living make of them. (6)

Rudolf Pfeiffer (7) emphasizes the significance of the language application within a historical context among the Greeks, pointing out that oratorical scholarship was originally the product of critical concerns with poetry. Texts were scrutinized for accuracy; allegories and hidden messages were systematically identified and described (8).

But the strictly linguistic analysis could not hold its own against the onslaught of the "scientific" dimension of Archimedes, Eratosthenes, Aristophenes and others. In the middle of the third century B.C. these viewpoints began to merge, and the oratorical tradition expanded to include aspects of the culture beyond language.

This change in perception is reflected in the work of Eratosthenes, a man of varied interests and numerous accomplishments in many fields--a renaissance personality. He wrote on Old Comedy, but also on chronology and geography, and on mathematics and astronomy as well. Pheiffer states that he "fully deserves to be honoured as the founder of critical chronology in antiquity." (9) When he applied his scientific-rationalistic perspective and refused to accept Homer as a historian or as a geographer, he stepped hard on the toes of the oratorical tradition of scholarship. He stepped harder when he generalized the position to poetry overall (10), proclaiming that poetry should be entertainment, not instruction. Eratosthenes became the target of cleaver mockery; but the influence of his position was felt. (Findings of modern archaeology, such as the rediscovery of Troy, have vindicated Homer and played havoc with 2000 years of scholarly analysis--but Eratosthenes had already made his point.)

Eratosthenes' criticisms were absorbed in the division between "scholarship" and "poetry" previously introduced in the work of Aristophenes, who, Pfeiffer says, "was neither a scientist nor a poet; he was a perfect scholar." (11) An expert in texts, language, literary criticism, and antiquities, he is credited with establishing the scholarly process characteristic of the rhetorical tradition, stressing creative concentration on textual and literary criticism, bowing to science for its role in strengthening critical considerations. He set a standard for identifying, purifying and validating ancient texts, in order that the

messages of the past would be preserved, polished, and presented with appropriate scholarly commentary by the caretakers of the literature--scholars. Thus the foundation was laid for *Rhetoric* among the Greeks and *Oration* among the Romans. A scholarly tradition was born that was to sail from antiquity into the modern world, where it is now generally harbored in what we call *the humanities*.

Although the composition of the rules has varied, the tradition has remained fairly constant. Occasional brushes with the philosophic (scientific) tradition have shifted emphasis toward discovery over preservation and caused a little friction over methodology--and perhaps, as in Eratosthenes' time, a little cross pollination. The New Haven Scholars of the nineteenth century illustrate some of this brushing. Having studied in Germany where the impact of nineteenth century positivism and rapid developments in the physical sciences were introducing a new rigor into classical scholarship, they hoped to bring this stance to America and use it to save Christianity from naturalistic modernism. Their position is represented by Noah Porter, whose work demanded "exact observation, precise definition, fixed terminology, classified arrangement, and rational explanation." They emphasized the scholar as a member of a discipline and of a community of scholars, with historical facts and stylistic rules as canons, although those facts were those that could be discerned by "the soul." (12)

This attempt to elevate the structure of oratorical scholarship as independent of and perhaps more significant than its content was rejected by individuals like Ralph Waldo Emerson, Porter's contemporary. Emerson felt that the most fruitful path to the truth about human beings should be a careful, honest, and intuitive scrutiny of life itself. Arranging facts according to an argument format for the sake of disputation, to Emerson, was not true scholarship and could only lead to "appearances," not to significant insights about life. In his 1837 Harvard Phi Beta Kappa address, "The American Scholar," Emerson explained that the true scholar's methodology will reveal "in the secrets of his own mind" those truths

which are in "the secrets of all minds," and that this need not take place in the confines of a college. (13)

The subsets of the oratorical tradition represented by the New Haven Scholars and by Emerson illustrate the range of difference within this tradition, even within the same time period. They also illustrate the dilemma of the modern rhetorical scholar: Many universities today would have little criticism of Noah Porter's rigorous requirements for a scholar, but what form of academic arrogance would dare deny that title to Ralph Waldo Emerson? Thus the contests within as well as between the scholarly traditions continue.

The Philosophic or Scientific Tradition

While the oratorical tradition seeks "truth" in the writings of the past, the philosophic or scientific tradition seeks it in the telescopes and microscopes of the past and present. Featherstone notes that the orators "see rightly, that all teaching is at some level a moral enterprise," but that scientists and philosophers "are uncertain about this." He continues the comparison: "When the philosophers ask, soaring like predatory hawks, 'what is virtue?' the orators tend to point blindly to tradition." (14)

Attempts have been made by individuals like Alexander Meikeljohn and Robert Hutchins to use "the orators' curriculum to promote the philosophers" goals," which Featherstone calls having "married a classics curriculum to the aim of developing the critical intellect" (15). Mortimer Adler's *Paideia Proposal* (1982) and the recent curricular guide for high schools proposed by the National Office of Education (1988) are further examples of this trend. Peter Shaw calls this "the undermining of the humanities" by modernists who quote classical material while disavowing its traditional form and intent, replacing it with "poststructuralism [that] divorces literature from life." Shaw further notes that the National Endowment for the Humanities was launched to promote "such enduring values as justice, freedom, virtue, beauty and truth." But today, he laments, Academics argue

over "Whose justice?" "Whose freedom?" "Whose virtue?"-- The white man's? The slave owner's? Patriarchy's? (16) The oratorical tradition didn't worry about such technicalities.

In *World Views: A Study in Comparative History* (1977), W. Warren Wager speaks of the interplay of these traditions in the discipline of modern history:

> In the broadest terms the new movements divide into two schools: the quantifiers and the explorers of consciousness. The quantifiers are the heirs of Descartes and Newton; the explorers of consciousness descend from Kant and Hegel. The new historical sociology and demography belong to the first school; the new psychohistory and intellectual history belong to the second. One views humankind as a measurable social animal, the other as spirit or mind. It is the old clash in Western culture . . . reenacted in new costumes with new possibilities of fruitful interaction or mutual invalidation. (17)

Wager points out one fruitful interaction as he discusses the discipline of intellectual history:

> It investigates humankind in its existential mode of being, as real men and women acting in the real world. It seeks to describe and explain events. Its goal is not to produce an abstract model of human behavior, or human nature, or society; it does not proclaim laws with predictive power; it has no license to identify the good the true or the beautiful.
> Even though much of its subject matter is the work of social scientists and philosophers, its methods and purposes are those of history. It seeks to know mankind existentially. (18)

Although this is not the type of history taught in the history departments of most modern universities, which are dominated by a purer form of the scientific tradition, its presence and its influence attest to the variety within the scientific tradition.

As intellectual history skirts the dividing line between the traditions by coming close to the humanism of the oratorical tradition within parameters acceptable to the scientific community, other scholarly pursuits likewise come close to closing the gap. The New Haven Scholars insisted on an almost "scientific," philological approach within the oratorical tradition; in contrast contemporary phenomenologists advocate a nearly subjective, observational, analytic approach within the scientific tradition, with an emphasis on *understanding, meaning, and discovering* which veers away from the *explanation, prediction,* and *control* of their more orthodox scientific compatriots.

Beneath the surface of the oratorical-scientific continuum, another pendulum in Western intellectual history continues to sway: the pendulum between *supernaturalism* and

naturalism. Discovering, preserving and sharing the values of either or both has continuously been at the core of human action; efforts to establish or defeat one or to somehow compromise the two generate continual tension in all areas of scholarly pursuit. At various times the struggle has been labeled *poetry vs. philosophy, romanticism vs. rationalism,* or *irrationalism vs. positivism,* but none of the resulting debates has successfully committed either academe or society to a lasting perspective. For many, the debate between competing "schools" has become a greater focus than the pursuit of the original search.

As scholarship has been unable to impact a resolution of this basic metaphysical question, the conventional scholar is left with a basically secular, but ill defined, ambiguous position, unable to satisfactorily confront some of the most significant issues confronting humanity. What is considered "scholarly" at a given point in time is a particular view that some currently prevailing power structure or highly persuasive individual or group of individuals is able to perpetuate and publicize to the satisfaction of others. This kind of selection (often socio-economic) manages to be embraced and followed (sometimes blindly). But as John Locke observed, "Without the notion and allowance of *spirit*, our philosophy will be lame and defective in one main part of it, when it leaves out the contemplation of the most excellent and powerful part of the creation." (19) The "lame and defective" element assessed by Locke has been verified and perpetuated, not lessened, with the passing of time.

Even those who seek and defend the supernatural find the traditionally scholarly stances leave them "lame and defective." For example, the New England Scholars found the oratorical tradition consistent with their self-defined mission to defend and promote the moral imperatives of Christianity, which they felt were under attack by a modern naturalistic world-view. They brought to this challenge the academic posture and methodological rationale of their German-acquired positivism. The attempt failed, and the

very methodology they borrowed eventually became the instrument of defeat (possibly an important lesson for others who would do the same).

Despite the sincerity and the skill of those who would attempt to rescue religion by "reason" or "empirical evidence," it is possible that neither the oratorical nor the philosophic tradition--or even a cleaver combination of the two--could ever contribute a safe, secure, or truly meaningful foundation for our inescapable attraction to the idea of *message* from a Supreme Being. For this reason, I believe that the conception of scholarship needs to be expanded to include the third perspective: the *faithful* tradition. My reason is that this tradition fosters an attitude not common to the two other traditions, but necessary to avoid the "lame and defective" result of which Locke warned, illustrated in the well-meaning but "lame and defective" attempts of the New Haven theorists.

The Revelatory, Testimonial or Faithful Scholarly Tradition

The revelatory, testimonial or faithful tradition of scholarship differs from the oratorical and scientific traditions in two fundamental areas. First, the scholar begins his search and delivers his report overtly attributing his premises to a divine source. Second, the primary burden of proof for validating the claims of his report is on its recipient, not its creator. The oratorical and scientific traditions are essentially disputational: Discussion is carried out for the sake of *ratification*. The faithful tradition urges discussion for its value in *clarification*. Confirmation in the faithful tradition is personal and may or may not become acceptable to a general public. Such acceptance, however, does not determine its value or truthfulness.

The first contrast is pointed out by Theodore Roszak, as he notes how those in the scientific tradition have tried to exclude personality and deity from their scholarly reports:

> Nothing in modern science would have appalled Plato more than the way in which a professional scientific paper seeks, in the name of objectivity, to depersonalize itself to the point of leaving out all reference to that "experience of excellence"--that fleeting glimpse of the higher Good . . . .

> There is a haunting and troubling strangeness about this interval in our history. One might almost believe that perverse forces which baffle the understanding were at work beneath the surface of events turning science into something that did not square with the personalities of its creators. What was it, for example, that inspired Descartes to regard mathematics as the new key to nature? An "angel of truth" who appeared to him in a series of numinous dreams on three successive nights. But in his writing he never once mentions the epistemological status of dreams or visionary experience. Instead, he turns his back on all that is not strict logic, opting for a philosophy of knowledge wholly subordinated to geometric precision. Yet that philosophy purchases its apparent simplicity by an appalling brutalization of the very existential subtleties and psychic complexities that are the living substance of Descartes' own autobiography. Newton, a man of stormy psychological depths, spent a major portion of his life in theological and alchemical speculations; but all this he carefully edited from his natural philosophy and his public life. . . . Arthur Koestler is not wide of the mark in calling the early scientists "sleepwalkers"--men who unwittingly led our society into a universe whose eventual godlessness they might well have rejected vehemently. (20)

The validation feature of the *faithful* tradition is also abundantly found in the literature. After properly acknowledging the source of the premises, the faithful scholar presents the message as clearly and honestly as possible, clarifying where necessary. Then the hearer is left to determine for himself or herself the validity of the message. The value of the message [truth] is independent of its submission to a process of public disputation. There is a place for corroborative testimony, but the value of a message does not depend on its winning the approval of a selected group of peers. Thus Jesus advised the students of his day that if they wanted to know the truth of a proposition, once they understood it, they would need to validate it for themselves (John 7:15-17). They did not need to wait until that proposition had received the sanction of a scholarly body-- which might or might not happen, depending on popular theology or politics.

Aspects of this pattern are illustrated in Galileo's efforts to share his discovery of the telescope with the people of his day. Some refused to look in the telescope and see for themselves, unwilling to risk validating Galileo's testimony, which would contradict the rules of their scholarly tradition. Discussing this human tendency to consider only what is already acceptable, Roszak observes, "After all, if Galileo was right to call those men fools who refused to view the moon through a telescope, what shall we say of those who refuse Blake's invitation to see eternity in a grain of sand?" (21)

Many individuals appear to have sensed the contribution of the *faithful tradition*, though they might not have embraced it fully. In his *Thoughts on Education*, No. 190, John Locke observes that the works of nature are the product of a wisdom that so far surpasses human faculties that Natural Philosophy--the knowledge of principles, properties and operations of things as they are in themselves--can never be fully reduced to a science. The search into nature, he felt, must be pursued within a spiritual context:

> I think it ought to go before the study of matter and body, not as a science that can be methodized into a system and treated of upon principles of knowledge; but as an enlargement of our minds towards a truer and fuller comprehension of the intellectual world to which we are led to both reason and revelation. And since the clearest and largest discoveries we have of other spirits, besides God and our own souls, is imparted to us from heaven by revelation, I think the information that at least young people should have of them, should be taken from that revelation. To this purpose, I conclude, it would be well, if there were made a good history of the Bible, for young people to read; . . . there would be instilled into the minds of children a notion and belief of spirits, they having so much to do in all the transactions of that history. (22)

John Locke would be appalled at the curriculum which the scientific tradition of scholarship and the modern naturalistic world-view have substituted for the history of the Bible and notion of spirits he recommended. Some of today's researchers point to the discrepancy. W.P.D. Wightman in his two-volume work *Science and the Renaissance* (23), D.J. Wilcox in his *In Search of God and Self* (24) , and Henry Acton in his *Religious Opinions and Example of Milton, Locke and Newton* (25) all make the point that the modern scholarly tradition distorts the records of the religious commitments of its own ancestry.

Conclusion

Scholarship must be redefined if it is to contribute to clarifying contemporary moral confusion. All three scholarly traditions must be legitimized and endorsed, and the concept of scholarship itself must be recognized as a means and not an end. Only within this new definition can we begin to realize that honest, thoughtful, personal admission of ignorance

is the most constructive and powerful dissent available to the academic community. We cannot long teeter on an unstable academic stool. We need the strengths inherent in each of the three scholarly traditions. If we are to successfully confront the challenges of our day, we will find it self-defeating if we allow one tradition to say to the others, "I have no need of thee." **Humility**--not affirmative action, diverse role models, politically correct expression, gender preference, or unbridled sexual expression--is our greatest resource.

Notes

1. Will Durant, *The Story of Philosophy* , 2nd ed. (New York: Simon and Schuster Inc., 1926), xxiii.

2. Ibid., xxv-xxix.

3. C.S. Lewis, *The Weight of Glory* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1965), 50-51

4. Jean Danielou, *God and the Ways of Knowing* (New York: Meridian Books Inc., 1957) is an example of acknowledging various vertical manifestations of knowledge--in this case of Deity and His works. Danielou explores the God of the religions, of the philosophers, of faith, of Jesus Christ, of the Church, and of the Mystics.

5. Michael Polanyi *Personal Knowledge* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1958) chapters 5 and 6.

6. Joseph L. Featherstone, Introduction, in Bruce A. Kimball, *Orators and Philosophers* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1986), ix-x.

7. Rudolf Pfeiffer, *History of Classical Scholarship* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 3.

8. It is noteworthy to add that Giorgio de Santillana calls the early Greek forms of science "scientific religions" and implies that conflicts would be natural between such religions. This may also help explain why later "sciences" consider departures from their doctrines as heresies. Giorgio de Santillana, *The Origins of Scientific Thought: From Anaxamander to Proclus, 600 B.C. - 500 A.D.* (New York: Mentor, 1961), 285-286.

9. Pfeiffer, 163.

10. Ibid., 166.

11. Ibid., 173.

12. Noah Porter, cited in Louise L. Stevenson, *Scholarly Means to Evangelical Ends* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 30-39.

13. Ralph Waldo Emerison, "The American Scholar," in *American Prose & Poetry*, ed. Normal Foerster (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), 486.

14. Featherstone, x-xi.

15. Ibid, xi-xii

16. Peter Shaw. "The Dark Ages of the Humanities," *The Intercollegiate Review* (Fall, 1987): vol. 22, 12.

17. W. Warren Wager, *World Views: A Study in Comparative History* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1977), 1-2.

18. Ibid., 2.

19. John Locke, cited by Lynchburg College, *Education: Ends and Means,* Symposium Readings, Classical Selections on Great Issues, series 1, vol. 2 (New York: University Press of America, 1980) 440.

20. Theodore Roszak, "The Monster and the Titan: Science, Knowledge, and Gnosis," *Daedalus* (Summer, 1974), vol. 103, 21-22, 28-29.

21. Ibid., 18-24.

22. Locke cited by Lynchburg College, 440.

23. W.P.D. Wightman, *Science and the Renaissance,* vol. 1, 6-7, 302-304.

24. D.J. Wilcox, *In Search of God and Self* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1975)

25. Henry Acton, *Religious Opinions and Example of Milton, Locke and Newton* (New York: AMS Press, 1973)